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PRECEDENTIAL
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Unit Manager of E-Unit at SCI Coal Township, FRANK D.
GILLIS, former Superintendent at SCI Coal Township,
KANDIS K. DASCANI, Grievance Officer at SCI Coal
Township, JOHN SIDLER, Licensed Psychologist Manager
at SCI Coal Township, SHARON M. BURKS, Chief
Grievance Officer in the Department of Corrections main
office Camp Hill, Pa
___________
On Appeal from the District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(No. 06-cv-278)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
___________
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Before: FUENTES, ALDISERT, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
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Jeffrey M Theodore (ARGUED)
David H. Coburn
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Attorneys for Appellant
Howard G. Hopkirk (ARGUED)
Office of the Attorney General
Appellate Litigation Section
15 th Floor, Strawberry Sq.
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Attorney for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Charles Renchenski is serving a life sentence
without the possibility for parole for murder in the first degree.
Although he was never charged with, nor convicted of, a sexual
offense, in 2005 Defendants classified Renchenski as a sex
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offender and recommended his enrollment in Pennsylvania’s
Sex Offender Treatment Program (“SOTP”). Renchenski filed
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that his forced
participation in sex offender treatment therapy violates several
constitutional rights, including his: Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process before being labeled a sex offender; Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination; and Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury adjudicate his guilt. He also
challenges the District Court’s conversion of Defendants’
motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion without
granting him leave to take discovery. Because we hold that an
inmate who has never been charged with, nor convicted of, a sex
offense is entitled to due process before Pennsylvania classifies
him as a sex offender, we reverse the District Court’s Order
entering summary judgment as to his procedural due process
claim. We affirm the District Court in all other respects.
I.1
Renchenski is incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania (“SCI-CT”), serving
a life sentence without the possibility of parole for his 1985
conviction of the murder-by-strangulation of Rose Marie Foley.
Renchenski’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) indicated that Ms.
Foley was found in an isolated rural area, and that “the body . .
. was clad only in a bra (which was unsnapped and pulled over
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Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are not in
dispute and are derived from the District Court’s opinion as well
as the Joint Appendix (“App.”).
3

the breasts), a blouse which was also above the breasts, and
socks.” (App. at 317.) An autopsy revealed multiple blunt force
trauma to the face and trunk, and abrasions and contusions on
Foley’s genitals. Additionally, her right breast was mutilated.
Under interrogation, Renchenski admitted that he had cut away
the skin around the victim’s nipple in an attempt to prevent law
enforcement from identifying his bite-marks.
Finally, the
autopsy noted hemorrhages in the area of her clitoris and vulva.
While Renchenski was never charged with, or convicted
of, sexually assaulting Foley, his PSR did indicate “sexual” as
a “past or present problem area.” (App. at 321.) Nevertheless,
his original correctional plan did not designate sexual as an area
of concern.2 From 1990 through 1999, however, Renchenski’s
prescriptive correctional program plan was altered to indicate
that sexual was an area of concern. When Pennsylvania adopted
its state-wide sex offender treatment program in 1999, prison
officials granted Renchenski’s request that this determination be
removed from his correctional plan.3 This status quo remained
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At the time Renchenski was committed to the DOC’s
custody, Pennsylvania had not adopted a standardized SOTP.
3

Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Code, effective January
21, 2003, sets forth a judge’s sentencing authority vis-à-vis
sexual offenders. It provides, in relevant part, that:
A person, including an offender designated as a
“sexually violent predator” . . . shall attend and
participate in a Department of Corrections
4

in place until 2003, when Renchenski was transferred to
SCI-CT.
Renchenski contends that after being transferred to SCICT, he complained to Defendant Williams, a prison counselor,
about his loss of single-cell status. When his complaints went
unanswered, Renchenski called Williams “slothful.”
Renchenski alleges that, in retaliation for this insult, Williams
classified him as a sex offender and enrolled him in a slew of
prison programs, including sex offender orientation, sex
offender core, and sex offender maintenance.
Pennsylvania’s SOTP is entitled “Responsible Living: A
Sex Offender Treatment Program” and consists of a seven-phase
behavioral modification course. Section 11(B) of the DOC’s
Policy Statement on Access to Mental Health Care (“Policy
13.8.1”) governs “risk/need assessment” and outlines how the
DOC evaluates sex offenders. It does not delineate how the
DOC determines whether or not an inmate is a sex offender. Id.

program of counseling or therapy designed for
incarcerated sex offenders if the person is
incarcerated in a State institution for any of the
following provisions under [Title 18].
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9718.1(a). In other words, this statute
mandates behavioral modification for sex offenders. Subsection
(c) of this statute delegates to the DOC the authority to “develop
and provide the program of counseling or therapy for
offenders.”
5

After the initial assessment, the treatment provider recommends
a final risk level based on, among other things, the risk of
recidivism, the attitude the inmate displays regarding sexual
crimes, and any indication that the offender has a primary sexual
attraction to children. Id. For prisoners assessed as moderateto-high-risk offenders, the seven-step SOTP consists of one
weekly two-hour group therapy session comprised of no more
that fifteen participants that continues for approximately two
years. See Policy 13.8.1 § 11(C)(2)(f). Throughout an inmate’s
involvement in the program, he or she can accumulate points for
attendance, participation, and for completing homework
assignments and major projects. An inmate “must accrue 85%
of the total possible points in order to ‘graduate’ from the
program.” Id. While an inmate who denies a past history of
sexual violence may initially participate in treatment, if he or she
persists in maintaining his or her innocence, the inmate will be
dismissed from the program.
The SOTP is run by qualified professionals. In order to
serve as a credentialed treatment provider, a staff member must
have a graduate degree in behavioral health or social sciences
and at least two years of experience with sex offender treatment.
Alternatively, a staff member may be credentialed if he or she
has an undergraduate degree in behavioral health and at least
2,000 hours of clinical sex offender treatment. The SOTP is
supervised by a Licensed Psychologist Manager.
Renchenski contested his sex offender designation, and
his complaint was referred to John Sidler, SCI-CT’s Chief
Psychologist. Sidler dismissed his complaint, because “based on
the official version of the offense, there [was] a high level of
6

sexual content involved. [Therefore, t]he Psychology
Department supports . . . [the] decision to add sexual offender
status.” (App. at 84.) Sidler noted that a correctional plan,
which is developed for each inmate, is designed to address an
inmate’s individual needs to prevent recidivism and to ensure a
smooth transition back into society. Sidler indicated that he
approved of Renchenski’s designation as a sex offender because
“[t]he official version of the crime indicate[d] that there was a
sexual component to the crime, as Renchenski was engaged in
a sexual act with the victim when the homicide occurred.” (Id.
at 286.) Sidler also stated that the “decision to recommend
Renchenski for sex offender programs was based upon the
[t]reatment team’s evaluation of him coupled with the sexual
component of Renchenski’s offense.” (Id. at 287.)
While Defendants claim that Renchenski’s name
currently appears on the institutional sex offender roster as a
“possible sex offender,” they maintain that he has not been
classified as a sex offender because he has refused to submit to
an assessment. (Id. at 289.) This assertion contradicts DOC’s
own policy, which provides that “[e]very inmate who refuses
assessment and/or treatment shall be identified as falling in the
Moderate/High risk category [of sex offender].” Policy 13.8.1
§ 11(B)(4)(g). Moreover, Defendants’ argument that Williams
merely recommended to the Psychology Department that
Renchenski be assessed to determine whether or not he needed
sex offender treatment is unsupported by the record, which
reveals that Williams recommended Renchenski participate in
three specific sex offender programs: orientation, core and
maintenance. Id. at 15; (App. at 265, 475.) Defendants also
admit that, under the current SOTP, at the time the DOC
7

commences a new treatment group, Renchenski would be
assessed for risk level and not for whether or not he needs
treatment. See Appellee’s Br. at 15.4
Defendants also contend that while “the recommended
programming may be a requirement of an inmate’s correctional
plan, an inmate’s participation in the specific program is
voluntary.” Id. at 10. This claim is also belied by the record.
For example, Policy 13.8.1 § 119(C)(1)(h) and (i) mandates that
sex offenders participate in treatment by using the phrase “shall
receive all seven phases” of therapy. Furthermore, in response
to Renchenski’s grievance, Larry Kaskie, the Unit Manager,
noted that if the Psychology Department determines he needs
counseling, he will be required to submit to the program. (App.
at 475.) In a subsequent correspondence, John Castrignano, a
Psychological Services Specialist, informed Renchenski that
“Participation in Sex Offender Programming is required as part
of your Correctional Plan[.]” (Id. at 458.) (emphasis in original);
see also (Id. at 454 [August 19, 2003 Letter from Superintendent
Gillis to Renchenski indicating that it was in his “best interest to
comply” with treatment.]). And while Renchenski concedes that
his refusal to participate has no effect on his parole status, he
notes that his protests nonetheless subject him to substantial
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In 2005 Renchenski was informed that SCI-CT was
starting a new sex offender group which permitted enrollment
of inmates who, like him, had in the past denied committing sex
offenses. Even though attendance at the SOTP is a requirement
of Renchenski’s correctional plan, he refused to participate and
therefore was never “assessed.”
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penalties, including the loss of his prison job, assignment to
disciplinary custody for ninety days, cell restriction for thirty
days, suspension of the right to receive visitors, and loss of
privileges such as access to television, radio and the
commissary. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2; see DC-ADM, 801,
Inmate Discipline Procedures Manual § 4.
1.

Procedural History

Renchenski filed the instant action, pro se, alleging
several constitutional violations. 5 Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss Renchenski’s amended complaint for failure to state a
claim, which Renchenski opposed. The magistrate judge issued
a Report and Recommendation, urging that dismissal was
appropriate. Following the receipt of Renchenski’s objections
to the Report and Recommendation, and Defendants’ opposing
brief, the District Court ordered Defendants to file a
supplemental brief addressing: (1) whether Renchenski was
currently under consideration for participation in the SOTP; (2)
the process for making such a determination; and (3) what, if
any, ramifications Renchenski faced for refusing to participate
in therapy. (App. at 5-6.)

5

Individually named Defendants include Thomas
Williams, a prison counselor; Joseph Piazza, Prison
Superintendent; Larry Kaskie, Unit Manager; Frank Gillis,
former Superintendent; Kandis Dascani, Grievance Officer;
John Sidler, Psychologist; and Sharon Burks, Chief Grievance
Officer.
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After reviewing Defendants’ Supplemental Brief, the
District Court issued an Order notifying the parties of its intent
to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. While the District Court’s Order was electronically
docketed, it is unclear if a hard copy was sent to Renchenski via
the United States Postal Service or whether he actually received
this notice. What is clear is that Renchenski did not file a Rule
56(f) affidavit seeking to delay disposition of the summary
judgment motion while he gathered evidence in support of his
opposition motion. Instead, he sought leave to file a third
amended complaint. In its Order and accompanying opinion, the
District Court denied Renchenski’s motion to file a third
amended complaint and granted summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor on all counts.
2.

The District Court’s Ruling

The District Court first rejected Renchenski’s claim that
because the SOTP required him to admit to past sexual crimes,
including the sexual component of the 1982 murder,
participation violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. The District Court properly considered this
claim in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24 (2002), which stressed that “compulsion” was the
key inquiry in any Fifth Amendment claim.6 The District Court
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“[T]he central question becomes whether the State’s
program, and the consequences for nonparticipation in it,
combine to create a compulsion that encumbers the
constitutional right. If there is compulsion, the State cannot
10

reasoned that: (1) Pennsylvania’s SOTP bore a rational
relationship to the legitimate penological objective of assessing
and rehabilitating inmates whose records indicate a potential
problem of a sexual nature; (2) the only consequence flowing
from non-participation in the program—being labeled a
“possible sex offender” on an internal prison roster— does not
rise to the level of compulsion; and (3) being labeled a possible
sex offender does not constitute an atypical and significant
hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Next, the District Court granted summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor on Renchenski’s Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process claim. First, the District Court noted
that Renchenski presented no evidence that he was forced to
undergo involuntary treatment. Alternatively, the District Court
held that Renchenski had neither an independent liberty interest,
nor a state-created liberty interest, which triggered the need for
due process protections. Because Renchenski is serving a life
sentence without the possibility of parole, the District Court
reasoned that refusing to participate in the SOTP would have no
tangible effect on his liberty. It also rejected his argument that
the stigma attached to merely labeling a prisoner a sex offender
gave rise to a liberty interest.
The District Court next disposed of Renchenski’s Equal
Protection Clause, Sixth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment
claims. First, the District Court ruled that Renchenski’s equal
protection claim failed because his allegations were vague and

continue the program in its present form . . . .” 536 U.S. at 35.
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conclusory. Similarly, the District Court held that Renchenski
could not sustain his Sixth Amendment claim because the
provisions of Pennsylvania’s code he cited to— 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 9791 et seq.— related to the sex offender registration
laws and not to the issues raised in his complaint. Next, the
District Court rejected Renchenski’s Eighth Amendment claim,
holding that while a cruel and unusual punishment claim may be
predicated on emotional injury, Renchenski failed to establish
that Defendants were aware that a substantial risk of serious
harm existed and deliberately disregarded that risk.
Accordingly, the District Court granted summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor on all counts and denied Renchenski’s motion
for leave to file a third amended complaint.7 Renchenski filed
a pro se appeal, and we appointed pro bono counsel.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over
Renchenski’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
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Having disposed of the claims addressed in the Report
and Recommendation, the District Court then stated its reasons
for denying Renchenski’s motion to file a third amended
complaint. The Court concluded that amendment would be
futile since the Ex Post Facto Clause claim Renchenski sought
to add was meritless because participation in SOTP would not
disadvantage him, and because participation in the program
would not affect the legal consequences of his crime of
conviction.
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a district court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion de
novo. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). “We apply the same standard
as the District Court: Summary judgment is appropriate only
where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Melrose Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, --- F.3d ----, 2010
WL 2814284, at *5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation & internal quotation
marks omitted). “The mere existence of some evidence in
support of the nonmovant is insufficient to deny a motion for
summary judgment; enough evidence must exist to enable a jury
to reasonably find for the nonmovant on the issue.” Giles v.
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
We review a district court decision refusing leave to amend a
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) for
abuse of discretion. See Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550
F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2008).
III.
Renchenski raises several substantive challenges and one
procedural challenge to the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in Defendants’ favor. We consider each in turn.
1.

Constitutional Challenges
a.

Due Process Clause Claim

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
13

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. A court reviewing a procedural due process claim
first determines whether the plaintiff asserts an interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d
107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). If the court concludes that such an
interest exists, the next issue is whether the procedures provided
to the plaintiff afforded that individual due process of law. Id.
i.

Identifiable Liberty Interest

While an inmate’s constitutional rights are diminished in
prison, “a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime.” Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Nonetheless, a convicted
criminal’s liberty interest is subject to “the nature of the regime
to which [(s)he has] been lawfully committed.” Id. at 556.
“Among the historic liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause is the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief
for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.” Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (internal quotations & citation
omitted).
Nevertheless, “changes in the conditions of
confinement having a substantial adverse impact on [a] prisoner
are not alone sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due
Process Clause as long as the conditions or degree of
confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the
sentence imposed upon him.” Id. at 493 (internal quotations &
alteration omitted).
A prisoner may be deprived of a liberty interest in
violation of the Constitution in two ways: (1) when severe
changes in conditions of confinement amount to a grievous loss
14

that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice
and an adequate hearing, id. at 488; and (2) when state statutes
and regulations create a liberty interest in freedom from restraint
that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life[,]” thereby
triggering due process protection, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995); see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 22327 (1976). The first is the so-called independent due process
liberty interest, while the latter is the so-called state-created
liberty interest.
Renchenski argues that the stigmatizing consequences of
being labeled a sex offender, when coupled with mandated
behavioral modification therapy, constitutes the kind of
deprivation of liberty that requires procedural protections.
Renchenski contends that although his conviction extinguished
his right to be free from confinement, it did not authorize
Pennsylvania to classify him as a sex offender without affording
him additional process.
In evaluating Renchenski’s argument, we are guided by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Vitek, in which the Court held
that the “involuntary transfer of a . . . state prisoner [convicted
of robbery] to a mental hospital implicate[d] a liberty interest
that is protected by the Due Process Clause.” 445 U.S. at 487.
While the Court based this holding, in part, on a state-created
liberty interest, it also held that the prisoner’s liberty interest
existed separate and apart from the state regulation.
Specifically, the Court noted that the stigmatizing
characterization of the prisoner as mentally ill, when coupled
with the transfer to an asylum to participate in mandatory
15

behavioral therapy, “constituted a major change in the
conditions of confinement amounting to a grievous loss that
should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and an
adequate hearing.” Id. at 488 (quotation marks omitted);
compare Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding
that a prisoner had an independent liberty interest in being free
from the arbitrary administration of psychotropic drugs), with
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224 (holding that the Due Process Clause
does not independently create a liberty interest in prisoners to be
free from intrastate prison transfers). The Court reasoned that
despite the prisoner’s conviction for robbery, he still “retained
a residuum of liberty that would be infringed . . . without
complying with minimum requirements of due process.” Vitek,
445 U.S. at 491. In turn, the Court concluded that transfer to a
mental institution was “‘qualitatively different’ from the
punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of
crime, and had ‘stigmatizing consequences.” Sandin, 515 U.S.
at 479 n.4 (citing Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493-94) (quotation marks
omitted). Thus, when determining an inmate’s due process right
“to be free from . . . unjustified intrusions on personal
security[,]” Vitek instructs courts to consider “[c]ompelled
treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification
programs[.]” 445 U.S. at 492.
Relying on Vitek, Renchenski argues that the District
Court erred in not recognizing that the Due Process Clause
independently conferred upon him a liberty interest in not being
classified as a sex offender—which he argues is even more
stigmatizing than being labeled as mentally ill—and forced into
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sex offender treatment without due process.8 We agree that only
after a prisoner has been afforded due process may sex offender
conditions be imposed on an inmate who has not been convicted
of a sexual offense.
It is largely without question—and Defendants do not
claim otherwise—that the sex offender label severely
stigmatizes an individual, and that a prisoner labeled as a sex
offender faces unique challenges in the prison environment.
Renchenski cites to numerous sociological and criminal justice
studies which conclude that sex offenders are considered “an
anathema in the inmate subculture . . . [and] inmate norms call
for their savage beating.” Appellant’s Br. at 9 (citing James E.
Robertson, Sex Offenders and the Criminal Justice System
83-87 (1994)). Sexual offender inmates are also ready targets
for sexual violence in prison. Indeed, studies suggest that sexual
offenders’ rate of sexual abuse in prison ranges from 34% to
50% higher than that of the general prison population.
Appellant’s Br. at 10 (citing Nancy Wolff et al., Understanding
Sexual Victimization Inside Prisons: Factors that Predict Risk,
6 Criminology and Pub. Pol’y 535, 549 (2007)). The Ninth
Circuit has stated that “[w]e can hardly conceive of a state’s
action bearing more stigmatizing consequences than the labeling
of a prison inmate as a sex offender.” Neal v. Shimoda, 131
F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665, 668 (5th
Cir. 2005) (noting that when a state labeled an individual as a
8

Even though Pennsylvania’s SOTP is based on a statute
and DOC regulations, Renchenski does not argue that his due
process claim stems from a state-created liberty interest.
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sex offender, it “strongly implied” that the identified individual
had committed a sex offense, “which can undoubtedly cause
adverse social consequences”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Chambers v. Colorado Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237,
1242 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the sex offender label is
“replete with inchoate stigmatization”). Accordingly, we agree
with Renchenski that classifying him as a moderate/high risk sex
offender—or even as a possible sex offender—is stigmatizing.

We also believe that the SOTP seven-step program,
which consists of weekly psychotherapy sessions for
approximately two years, is sufficiently similar to the forced
transfer to a mental institution that the Supreme Court
determined triggered a liberty interest in Vitek. Just as the
Supreme Court reasoned that being confined to a mental
institution was not within the sentence imposed on the prisoner
in Vitek, who was incarcerated and being punished for robbery,
mandating Renchenski’s participation in SOTP is not within the
sentence imposed since he is incarcerated for committing
murder in the first degree and not for committing a sexual
offense. In other words, because Renchenski was convicted of
murder and his punishment is predicated upon that conviction,
sex offender treatment is not one of the conditions of
confinement that his sentence imposes upon him. In turn,
compelled treatment, i.e., sex offender therapy, changes the
conditions of Renchenski’s sentence and, accordingly,
constitutes a loss of liberty that exceeds his loss of freedom from
confinement. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492.
We agree with the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, which
18

have held that labeling a prisoner a sex offender and forcing him
or her to submit to intensive therapy triggers a liberty interest.
For example, in Kirby v. Siegelman the Eleventh Circuit held
that Alabama’s classification of inmate Edmond as a sex
offender implicated a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause, and it remanded to the district court to determine
whether the procedures afforded by the state satisfied the
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements. 195 F.3d 1285, 1287,
1290 (11th Cir. 1999). Edmond was serving a twenty-year
sentence for attempted murder, and the state classified him as a
sex offender based on two prior sex-related crimes listed in his
PSR. Id. at 1288. Edmond was not convicted of either sex
crime. In fact, the grand jury did not return a true bill for the
charge of rape upon which Alabama relied. Id. Once classified
as a sex offender, Edmond was required to participate in group
therapy sessions in order to be eligible for parole. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Due Process
Clause gave rise to an independent liberty interest in not being
labeled a sex offender and that “[a]n inmate who has never been
convicted of a sex crime is entitled to due process before the
state declares him to be a sex offender.” Id. at 1292. It
reasoned that branding Edmond a sex offender and forcing him
to participate in behavioral modification therapy constituted a
change in his confinement so severe that it exceeded the
sentence imposed by the trial court. Id. at 1291. While the
Eleventh Circuit briefly mentioned that Edmond’s refusal to
participate in the therapy program affected his eligibility for
parole, the court did not indicate that this fact was dispositive.
Rather, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the stigma associated
with being labeled a sex offender, which, when coupled with
19

mandatory therapy, was sufficiently similar to Vitek to trigger
due process protection. Id. at 1292.
Similarly, in Coleman v. Dretke, the Fifth Circuit held
that requiring a prisoner to register as a sex offender and
participate in therapy as a condition of supervised release
triggered a liberty interest. 395 F.3d 216, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2004)
(rehearing en banc denied). While on parole for burglary,
Coleman was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a minor,
but pleaded guilty to misdemeanor assault. The parole panel
required him to register as a sex offender and participate in
behavioral modification as part of his supervised release. He
was never given notice of an opportunity to contest these
conditions, and when he failed to participate in therapy, his
parole was revoked.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in
Kirby, and relying on Vitek, held that “prisoners who have not
been convicted of a sex offense have a liberty interest created by
the Due Process Clause in freedom from sex offender
classification and conditions.” Id. at 222. The court noted that
in addition to the extreme stigmatization associated with being
labeled a sex offender, the “state’s sex offender therapy,
involving intrusive and invasive behavioral modification
techniques[,] is analogous to the treatment provided for in
Vitek.” Id. at 223. Therefore, while conceding that parolees
often are required to participate in “some form of counseling .
. . as a condition on their release . . . due to its highly invasive
nature, [the SOTP] is qualitatively different from other
conditions which may attend an inmate’s release.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the court ruled that
20

Coleman’s liberty interest triggered procedural due process
protections.
We agree with this analysis and join the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits in holding that the stigmatizing effects of
being labeled a sex offender, when coupled with mandatory
behavioral modification therapy, triggers an independent liberty
interest emanating from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
First, Defendants contend, and the District Court agreed, that
Renchenski has not been labeled as a sex offender, but rather
has been designated a “possible sex offender” whom DOC has
recommended be assessed to determine whether he would
benefit from participation in the SOTP. This assessment,
Defendants claim, is routine and a necessary part of the
rehabilitative process and prison management.9 This argument
is unconvincing for several reasons. First, Defendants cite to no
evidence in the record (such as the institutional sex offender’s
roster which they did not include in the joint appendix)
9

Defendants also argue that Renchenski’s claim of
stigmatization falls short because he has introduced no evidence
in opposition to their motion for summary judgment
demonstrating that the population at SCI-CT is aware of his
status or that SCI-CT has publicized the issue. This argument
is belied by the fact that the weekly therapy sessions are group
therapy sessions, which comprise as many as fifteen inmates. If
Renchenski were forced to participate, his categorization as a
sex offender would surely be known to the prison population.
21

supporting their assertion that Renchenski was labeled merely
as a possible sex offender. Renchenski, on the other hand, notes
that DOC classified him as a “mod/high” Sex Offender. (App.
at 323.) Indeed, a letter from Sidler responding to Renchenski’s
grievance signals DOC’s intention to add sex offender status to
his correctional plan. (Id. at 84, 92.) In any event, we discern no
difference for stigmatization purposes between being labeled a
sex offender and being labeled a possible sex offender.
Moreover, Defendants’ assertion that the assessment
Renchenski must submit to is routine and part of the
rehabilitative process is belied by the DOC’s own regulations.
Policy 13.8.1 § 11, which, as noted, governs inmates’ behavioral
health care, describes the assessment process in detail. A review
of this section indicates that the assessment does not determine
whether or not an inmate should be classified as a sex
offender—the very process Renchenski claims he is entitled to.
Rather, the assessment is a tool used to ascertain the level of sex
offender risk associated with each inmate in order to decide
which therapy group (moderate/high or moderate/low) is most
appropriate for the prisoner and to determine the risk of threat
to the community. See Policy 13.8.1 § 11(C)(1)(c). The
regulations do not indicate that a possible outcome of the
assessment is a determination that the inmate should not
participate in SOTP at all. Thus, once at the assessment stage,
the stigma of sex offender status has already attached to the
inmate.
Next, Defendants contend that because the assessment is
routine, it does not constitute a significant or atypical hardship
in the context of ordinary prison life. If Renchenski were a
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convicted sex offender, this statement would ring true since
Pennsylvania law requires a sex offender to participate in
treatment as part of normal prison life. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
9718. In other words, in Pennsylvania a convicted sex
offender’s punishment includes participation in sex offender
therapy. Here, however, Renchenski is a convicted murderer
and there is no evidence suggesting that sex offender treatment
is part of the punishment imposed on convicted murderers in
Pennsylvania. Nor did Defendants offer evidence suggesting
that all prisoners, regardless of their offense of conviction, are
assessed to determine their level of sex offender risk and the
appropriate sex offender treatment group. In any event,
Defendants conflate the independent due process liberty interest
test with the significant and atypical hardship test, which is
utilized to determine whether a state-created liberty interest
exists. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84 (“States may under
certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected
by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally
limited to . . . not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected
manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause
of its own force . . . [as opposed to a state-created liberty interest
which] imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” (internal
citations & quotation marks omitted)). Here, Renchenski argues
that his claimed liberty interest is protected by the Due Process
Clause itself, which requires a showing of a severe change in
conditions of confinement. Thus, whether sex offender
treatment therapy is routine within Pennsylvania’s prisons is
immaterial.
Perhaps recognizing the fault in relying on the significant
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and atypical hardship standard, Defendants also argue that
Renchenski has failed to highlight any significant change in his
conditions of confinement. They contend that participation in
the SOTP would consume only a small fraction of his time in
prison and therefore that the treatment is dissimilar to Vitek,
where the inmate was physically removed to a mental institution.
This argument misses the mark. While the Supreme Court in
Vitek was certainly concerned over the physical transfer of the
prisoner, they emphasized their concern was with “[c]ompelled
treatment in the form of behavioral modification programs.”
445 U.S. at 492. Seizing on this language, at least two of our
sister circuits have also focused on the intrusive nature of
behavioral modification and neither the Fifth or Eleventh
Circuits required any sort of physical transfer as a prerequisite
for finding a liberty interest. See e.g., Coleman, 395 F.3d at
222-23; Kirby, 195 F.3d at 1292; Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d
818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, while a physical transfer
may be sufficient to constitute a change in a prisoner’s
confinement, Vitek, Coleman and Kirby do not stand for the
proposition that a transfer is necessary for such a finding.
Defendants next argue that Renchenski’s participation in
the SOTP is “voluntary” and markedly different from Vitek,
where the plaintiff was transferred to a mental hospital. We
disagree. This argument is belied by the fact that according to
DOC policy refusing to submit to an assessment earns
Renchenski the label of a “mod/high” sex offender. In other
words, if Renchenski refuses to participate, he will face the very
stigmatization of being labeled a sex offender that he claims
triggers constitutional protection.
Additionally, prison
regulations indicate that Renchenski will face punishments for
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refusing to participate.
Moreover, we find no material difference between an
inmate refusing to participate in sex offender treatment and a
prisoner seeking to forestall transfer to avoid participation in
mental health therapy. Unless both plaintiffs are physically
dragged to therapy, both “voluntarily” refuse to participate.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Vitek indicating that the mandatory nature of the treatment at
the state-run mental hospital was any different than the
mandatory nature of the SOTP to which Renchenski is subject.
Likewise, while the Eleventh Circuit in Kirby noted that
the plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the SOTP impacted his
eligibility for parole, that opinion focused and was predicated on
stigma combined with compelled therapy. And while the Fifth
Circuit in Coleman also noted the effect non-participation had
on the plaintiff’s parole, the court rejected the notion that the
prisoner enjoyed a state-created liberty interest and focused
instead on the stigma and intrusive nature of behavioral
modification therapy. But see Neal, 131 F.3d at 827-29 (holding
in the state-created liberty interest context that while
participation in Hawaii’s sex offender therapy was technically
voluntary, because refusing to participate rendered an inmate
completely ineligible for parole, the “coercive component of the
SOTP [was] functionally equivalent to the psychiatric treatment
required by the statute at issue in Vitek”). The Fifth Circuit went
even further and distinguished sex offender treatment from other
therapy programs offered and mandated by Texas’ prisons
because of the highly stigmatizing and intrusive nature of sex
offender therapy. 395 F.3d at 224.
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Grennier v. Frank, 453
F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2006) does not alter this analysis. In
Grennier, the court held that the stigmatization of being called
a sex offender and being denied parole on that basis does not
implicate due process. Grennier does not inform our decision
since it involved a claim of a state-created liberty interest, which
Renchenski does not assert is the basis for his liberty interest.
Additionally, we disagree with the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretations of Kirby and Coleman as being predicated solely
upon the fact that prisoners must participate in the SOTP in
order to be eligible for parole. Unlike in Neal, where eligibility
for parole was a dispositive factor, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits’ decisions were grounded in stigmatization coupled
with “some other tangible element”, i.e., mandated sex offender
treatment therapy. See Coleman, 395 F.3d at 223 n.26.
We recognize that prisons have a strong interest in
enrolling their inmates in various rehabilitative programs and
that prison administrators are in the best position to exercise
discretion in administering those programs. We agree with
Renchenski, however, that he has an independent liberty interest
in not being labeled a sex offender, which results in mandatory
sex offender therapy as part of a prescriptive correctional plan.
The Fourteenth Amendment therefore entitles Renchenski to
adequate process before Defendants can take this action.
ii.

Adequate Procedure

Having determined that Renchenski has a due process
liberty interest in not being labeled a sex offender and forced
into treatment, we turn to what process will satisfy the
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Fourteenth Amendment.
“When protected interests are
implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.
. . . [A] weighing process has long been a part of any
determination of the form of hearing required in particular
situations by procedural due process.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 830
(quoting Bd. Of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569-70 (1972)) (emphasis omitted). Because Renchenski was
never charged with, nor convicted of, a sex offense, the
procedure he was afforded during his trial and conviction for the
1982 murder cannot serve as the sufficient procedural safeguard
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Nor has he been afforded
the opportunity to properly challenge his sex offender
classification. See Coleman, 395 F.3d at 221.
Given Renchenski’s first degree murder conviction and
the strong State interest in administering rehabilitative programs
and maintaining order within the prison, however, Defendants
need not commence “a new adversary criminal trial” before
labeling Renchenski a sex offender and recommending him for
therapy. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment entitles him to minimum
procedures which will result in “an effective but informal
hearing.” Id. at 485. These include: (1) written notice to
Renchenski that Defendants are considering classifying him as
a sex offender and mandating his participation in SOTP; (2) a
hearing, held sufficiently after the notice to permit Renchenski
to prepare, which includes: disclosure of the evidence
Defendants would rely upon for the classification, and an
opportunity for Renchenski to be heard in person and to present
documentary evidence; (3) an opportunity to present witness
testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by
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Defendants, “except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of
good cause for not permitting such presentation, confrontation,
or cross-examination”; (4) administration of the hearing by an
independent decisionmaker; (5) rendering of a written statement
by the decisionmaker as to the evidence relied on and the
reasons for Renchenski’s classification; and (6) “[e]ffective and
timely notice of all the foregoing rights.” Vitek, 445 U.S. at
494-95 (citation omitted).10 “[T]he process should be flexible
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and
other material that would not be admissible in an adversary
criminal trial.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and remand
this case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.11

10

We do not hold that due process requires the State to
appoint Renchenski counsel at this hearing.
11

The District Court did not address, and the parties did
not raise in their appellate briefs, issues of qualified immunity
or the appropriateness of monetary damages. Nor was the
important question of the allocation of the burden of persuasion,
or the extent of Defendants’ evidentiary burden, adequately
presented to the District Court. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d
1077 (3d Cir. 1997). We express no opinion on these issues and
trust that the District Court will address them on remand.
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b.

Fifth Amendment Claim

Assuming, arguendo, that after a constitutionally sound
administrative hearing Defendants determine he is subject to sex
offender treatment, Renchenski claims that dubbing him a sex
offender and mandating participation in the SOTP would violate
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Fifth
Amendment, incorporated and made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a state from
compelling a person to incriminate himself or herself. U.S.
Const. amend. V (providing that no person “shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”). While the
“privilege against self-incrimination does not terminate at the
jailhouse door . . . [a] broad range of choices that might infringe
constitutional rights in a free society fall within the expected
conditions of confinement of those who have suffered a lawful
conviction.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002). The Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination applies not only in
criminal trials, but whenever the state seeks to compel an
individual to be a witness against himself or herself and divulge
information that might incriminate that person in future criminal
proceedings. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426
(1984).
The Supreme Court outlined the contours of a prisoner’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in McKune,
which involved a convicted sex offender’s challenge to Kansas’
compulsory sex offender program and required him to admit his
crime of incarceration, as well as any other past sex crimes. 536
U.S. at 29. The information revealed by a prisoner during the
sexual abuse treatment program was not privileged, Kansas
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reserved the right to use that information in future criminal
proceedings, and it tested the veracity of the prisoner’s
admissions with a polygraph. Id. at 30.
Lile, the state
prisoner-plaintiff, was informed that if he refused to participate
in treatment, his privilege status would be reduced from Level
III to Level I, resulting in the curtailment of his visitation rights,
earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to his
family, and other privileges. Id. at 31. Lile would also be
transferred to a maximum-security prison where his movement
would be limited, where he would be placed in a four-person
(instead of a two-person) cell, and where he would be
surrounded by more dangerous criminals. Id. Lile filed a Fifth
Amendment challenge to the compulsory sex offender therapy
based on the fact that incriminating statements made during
counseling were not privileged. Lile also argued that the
purported punishments he faced if he refused to participate were
sufficiently coercive as to constitute a violation of the right
against self-incrimination.
A plurality of the Supreme Court rejected this argument.
Before finding it necessary to address the issues of privilege and
immunity that Lile asserted rendered his participation in the sex
offender therapy program a Fifth Amendment violation, the
Court instructed that compulsion was the linchpin, since the
initial and “central question [was] whether the State’s program,
and the consequences for non-participation in it, combine to
create a compulsion that encumber[ed] [the prisoner’s Fifth
Amendment rights.]” Id. at 35. Referencing Sandin, the
plurality held that a “prison clinical rehabilitation program . . .
does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination if the
adverse consequences an inmate faces for not participating are
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related to the program objectives and do not constitute atypical
and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Id. at 37-38. Turning to Lile’s case, the Court
noted that refusing to participate in sexual abuse treatment did
not extend his term of incarceration, or affect his eligibility for
good time credits or parole. Id. at 38. The Court also reasoned
that the move to a maximum-security prison was not intended to
punish Lile, but to make beds available to other inmates willing
to participate in the program. Id. Finally, the plurality defined
the consequences of Lile’s reduction to Level I not as
punishments, but as “incentives to behave,” and reasoned that
the “Constitution accords prison officials wide latitude to
bestow or revoke these perquisites as they see fit.” Id. at 39.
Perquisites, the Court said, merely made prison life more
tolerable. Id. at 42. Thus, the Court directed lower courts to
“decide whether the consequences of an inmate’s choice to
remain silent are closer to the physical torture against which the
Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms against
which it does not.” Id. at 41. Because the consequences of
Lile’s refusal were de minimis, the Court ruled that his choice,
though not voluntary in the colloquial sense, did not amount to
compulsion. Id. at 44.
Justice O’Connor concurred with the plurality’s
judgment, but explicitly rejected the plurality’s atypical and
significant hardship standard, agreeing with the Stevens’
plurality that the compulsion standard was broader than the test
outlined in Sandin. Id. at 48-49. She concurred in the
judgment, however, because she felt that the alterations in Lile’s
prison conditions resulting from his refusal to participate in
treatment did not constitute compulsion since “[n]ot all pressure
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necessarily compels incriminating statements.” Id. (alteration in
original). Justice O’Connor cited some of the penalties the
Court previously had identified as so great as to constitute
compulsion. These included termination of employment, loss of
professional license, inability to receive government contracts,
and inability to hold public office. Id. at 49-50 (citations
omitted). These were “grave” consequences, whereas the
consequences Lile faced were minor. Justice O’Connor,
however, explicitly rejected the portion of Justice Stevens’
plurality opinion that reasoned that because the penalties for
refusal to participate were the same penalties levied against
prisoners for disciplinary violations, the punishments constituted
compulsion. To the contrary, she noted that there “is a
difference between the sorts of penalties that would give a
prisoner a reason not to violate prison disciplinary rules and
what would compel him to expose himself to criminal liability.”
Id. at 52.
Relying on McKune, Renchenski contends that the
penalties for refusing to participate in the SOTP rise to the level
of compulsion and therefore violate his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.12 He contends that the District Court
incorrectly focused on the plurality’s atypical and significant
hardship test, which requires a heightened showing to establish
compulsion compared to the more modest showing required by
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. Renchenski also argues that
the District Court erred when it held that the only consequences
12

Like Kansas’ treatment program, Pennsylvania’s
program requires participants to admit to all past crimes and
offers no privilege for those confessions.
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of refusing to participate are that his name would be listed on
the offender’s roster as a “possible sex offender.”
Even though Renchenski is correct that Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence controls, his Fifth Amendment claim
nevertheless fails because the consequences he faces for
refusing to participate in the SOTP do not rise to the level of
compulsion even under Justice O’Connor’s narrower standard.
See United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting that when “no one view garners a majority of the
Justices . . . . the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment[] on the narrowest grounds”) (internal quotation marks
& citation omitted). Renchenski’s attempt to classify the
consequences he faces as more severe than the consequences at
issue in McKune is unpersuasive.
Renchenski first notes that his refusal to participate in sex
offender treatment—a Class I violation—may result in loss of
his prison job. While the Supreme Court has recognized that
loss of livelihood amounts to compulsion, it has not done so in
the prison context. To the contrary, in her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor noted that a reduction in prison wages did not
constitute compulsion because the “prison is responsible for
caring for respondent’s basic needs, [and therefore] his ability
to support himself is not implicated by the reduction in wages he
would suffer as a result.” McKune, 536 U.S. at 51. This logic
is equally applicable to loss of a prison job. Even if Renchenski
lost his only source of income, the DOC would still provide him
with food, shelter and access to medical care.

33

Renchenski counters that “[b]ecause he requires the
income from his prison job to pursue the appeal of his
conviction, loss of that job condemns him to remain in prison.”
Appellant’s Br. at 38. This argument is entirely unpersuasive.
Renchenski remains in prison because a jury of his peers
convicted him of first degree murder and the likelihood of
prevailing in a collateral attack on his 1984 conviction is far too
remote to constitute a basic need for Fifth Amendment purposes.
See United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1977)
(noting the strong presumption that the judgments of state
criminal courts are valid). Indeed, in January 2010, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed Renchenski’s petition
for post-conviction relief, ruling that while his initial petition
was timely, his decade-plus delay in pursuing his collateral
attack constituted abandonment of his claim, and that
Renchenski’s “failure to pursue his PCRA petition has now
created a situation where the Commonwealth would be severely
prejudiced were it required to retry the case.” Commonwealth
v. Renchenski, 988 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
Renchenski has not appealed this ruling. Simply put, his case is
closed. Furthermore, we do not think that Renchenski’s desire
to pursue a collateral attack on his 1984 conviction with wages
earned from his prison job constitutes a “basic need” for Fifth
Amendment purposes.
Nor do any of the other consequences Renchenski faces
for refusal to participate in the SOTP rise to the requisite level
of compulsion. Prison regulations list the following outcomes
for failure to participate in the SOTP: assignment to disciplinary
custody for ninety days, cell restriction for thirty days,
suspension of the right to receive visitors, and loss of privileges
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such as access to television, radio and the commissary. See
DC-ADM, 801, Inmate Disciplinary Procedures Manual § 4.
(App. at 500-01.) As noted above, in McKune at least five
Justices rejected the argument that loss of privileges, such as
access to television and radio, as well as suspension of the right
to receive visitors, constituted compulsion for Fifth Amendment
purposes.
Furthermore, these “punishments” are the same
consequences inmates face for a variety of infractions. In
addition to refusing to attend mandatory rehabilitative
correctional programs, Class I charges encompass refusing to
obey an order, violating visiting regulations, failing to report
contraband, etc. (App. at 517.) The consequences for
committing any of these infractions are the same. In other
words, Renchenski’s refusal to participate in SOTP may result
in the same consequence as another inmate’s failure to stand for
count or refusal to participate in a drug treatment program. This
is significant because in her McKune concurrence, Justice
O’Connor specifically rejected Justice Stevens’ conclusion that
because “the penalties facing [Lile] for refusal to incriminate
himself are the same as those imposed for prison disciplinary
violations . . . they are coercive.” 536 U.S. at 51. Here,
Renchenski merely confronts the same penalties that his peers
who commit any of the numerous enumerated Class I
disciplinary violations face.
Moreover, in McKune Justice O’Connor rejected Lile’s
suggestion that transferring him to a maximum-security
prison—a more dangerous prison—amounted to punishment.
Here, Renchenski may be sent to disciplinary custody or placed
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on cell restriction. While this penalty will undoubtedly
inconvenience and isolate Renchenski, it is a far less serious
consequence than transferring a prisoner from a medium-to a
maximum-security prison, which the Supreme Court previously
found did not rise to the level of compulsion.
In short, loss of his prison job and other consequences
that flow from his refusal to participate in the SOTP do not rise
to the level of compulsion which would compel Renchenski to
expose himself to criminal liability. Therefore, we affirm the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’
favor on Renchenski’s Fifth Amendment claim.
c.

Remaining Constitutional Claims

Renchenski next contends that classifying him as a sex
offender when he was never charged with, nor convicted of, a
sex offense violates his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury. [The Supreme Court has] held
that these provisions require criminal convictions to rest upon a
jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element
of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)
(quotation marks & citation omitted). Because he was found
guilty of murder in the first degree under Pennsylvania law, and
not with a crime that contains a sexual element, Renchenski
claims that labeling him a sex offender and mandating his
participation in behavioral modification therapy violates the
Sixth Amendment.
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Renchenski cites to Supreme Court cases that stand for
the broad proposition that an individual accused of a crime may
be found guilty based only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of each element of the crime. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
359 (1970) (holding that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
among the essentials of due process and fair treatment’ required
during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an
act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196 (1948) (holding that the charging document must give the
defendant notice of the elements of the charged crime). His
reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced since they all
involved criminal proceedings. See United States v. Zucker, 161
U.S. 475, 481 (1896) (noting that the Sixth Amendment is
limited to criminal proceedings); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 440 n.16 (1960) (affirming that Sixth Amendment
protections apply only during criminal proceedings). Because
Pennsylvania’s SOTP is not a criminal proceeding, the Sixth
Amendment is not implicated. Here, Defendants did not charge
Renchenski with rape and adjudge him guilty of the crime.
Rather, they evaluated his file and determined—albeit without
the protections of due process—that the nature of his crime
made him a candidate for sexual offender treatment.
Similarly, Renchenski’s reliance on Jenkins v.
McKetihen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969) is misplaced. Jenkins involved
a challenge to Louisiana’s Labor Management Commission of
Inquiry, which was tasked with investigating alleged violations
of state and federal labor law. Its purpose was to recommend to
the governor whether there was probable cause to believe that an
individual or organization had violated criminal laws. The
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Commission had the power to subpoena witnesses, but the target
of the investigation could not call witnesses. The Supreme
Court held that the Commission violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Commission “exercises a function very
much akin to making an official adjudication of criminal
culpability.” Id. at 427. The Court went on to note that:
In the present context, where the Commission
allegedly makes an actual finding that a specific
individual is guilty of a crime, we think that due
process requires the Commission to afford a
person being investigated the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject
only to traditional limitations on those rights.
Id. at 429. Unlike the Commission in Jenkins, here Defendants
are not accusing Renchenski of a new crime and making
culpability judgments. Nor are Defendants concerned with
exposing violations of criminal law. Id. at 428. Rather, they are
focused on ensuring that sexual deviants receive the appropriate
treatment to minimize the risk of future offense and to create a
safer environment within the prison.
Renchenski’s case is more akin to Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420 (1960), a case in which the Civil Rights Commission
survived a due process challenge. The Civil Rights Commission
was tasked with investigating allegations of voter suppression.
Targets of the Commission challenged its constitutionality on
due process grounds, arguing that they were entitled: (1) to
notice of the nature of the charges against them; (2) to know the
identity of the complainants; (3) and to cross-examine their
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accusers. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding
that the Commission “does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials
or determine anyone’s civil or criminal liability. It does not
issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any legal
sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone of
his life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 441. Similarly here,
Defendants are not adjudicating Renchenski guilty of rape; nor
are they extending his sentence or determining civil liability.
Rather, they are classifying him as a prisoner who, because of
the nature of his crime, would benefit from sexual offender
therapy. And although, as noted above, Defendants’ actions do
implicate Renchenski’s liberty interest, this constitutional
violation can be cured by affording him the appropriate due
process. The liberty interest, however, does not give rise to a
Sixth Amendment claim and certainly does not transform
Pennsylvania’s correctional plans into criminal proceedings.
Therefore, we affirm the District Court’s grant of Defendants’
motion for summary judgment based on Renchenski’s Sixth
Amendment claim.
The District Court also properly held that Defendants
were entitled to summary judgment on Renchenski’s equal
protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To prevail on an equal
protection claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that s/he has
been treated differently from persons who are similarly
situated.” Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir.
2003).
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If state action does not burden a fundamental
Constitutional right or target a suspect class, the
challenged classification must be upheld if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the
classification. If the challenged state action
involves a suspect classification based on race,
alienage or national origin, or infringes on a
fundamental constitutional right, we must apply
the strict scrutiny standard.
Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 107
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted).
In his Amended Complaint, Renchenski accused
Defendants of not providing him with “Equal Protection of the
Law by ignoring State and Federal laws while sanctioning the
plaintiff as a sex offender without adhering to procedural
safeguards provided for by the law.” (App. at 75.) Although we
are mindful that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally,
see Giles, 571 F.3d at 322, we nevertheless affirm the District
Court’s ruling that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on Renchenski’s equal protection claim. Renchenski did not
allege, nor raise a material issue of fact demonstrating that
Defendants treated him differently because he is a member of a
suspect class or because he exercised a fundamental right. See
City of Cleburn v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1985).
Nor can Renchenski maintain an equal protection claim
based on the “class of one” theory of liability outlined by the
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Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562 (2000). In Olech, the Court permitted a plaintiff to proceed
on a class of one theory when the plaintiff alleged that she had
been “intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there [was] no rational basis for the difference
in treatment.” Id. at 564; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). Here Renchenski argues that
“the state has created a suspect ‘class of one’ into which
[Renchenski] has been placed . . . [and that] there are no
‘similarly situated’ individuals due to [Renchenski] having no
sex offense history.” Appellant’s Reply Br. I at 17. His claim
fails because he has adduced no evidence of unequal treatment,
and in order to forestall summary judgment, Renchenski must
bring forth enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find in his favor. Here, he makes mere conclusory allegations.
And these allegations, even if accepted as true, fall short. He
does not allege, for example, that he is the only inmate in SCICT who, though not charged or convicted of a sex offense, was
nonetheless labeled a sex offender based on a history of abusive
sexual behavior and recommended to sex offender therapy.
Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary
judgment in Defendants’ favor on Renchenski’s Equal
Protection Clause claim.
Similarly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on Renchenski’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth
Amendment “prohibits punishment which violate[s] civilized
standards of humanity and decency.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112
F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). To prove a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that prison conditions deprived him of life’s minimum
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necessities, that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, and that
“a prison official acted with deliberate indifference in subjecting
him to that deprivation.” Id. Prison “[c]onditions must not
involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may
they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
warranting imprisonment.” Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di
Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 997 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
Renchenski presents no evidence that he was denied
food, water, clothing, shelter, sanitation, or medical care.
Rather, he argues that the Defendants’ actions caused him
“extreme stress and anxiety.” (App. at 75.) We have held that
“[e]motional distress can produce injury of the same severe
magnitude as occurred in the cases of physical harm and
withholding necessary medical care, and it can be inflicted in the
same wanton and unreasonable manner.” Rhodes v. Robinson,
612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979). To succeed on an Eighth
Amendment claim predicated on emotional distress, however,
we also require that the defendant’s wanton and unnecessary
infliction of emotional harm include an improper state of mind.
Id.
“Where a person suffers injury as an incidental and
unintended consequence of official actions, the abuse of power
contemplated in the due process and Eighth Amendment cases
does not arise.” Id. Renchenski’s complaint lacks any
allegation that Defendants acted with the requisite culpability
necessary to finding an Eighth Amendment violation. Rather,
the stress Renchenski suffered was incidental to Defendants’
official actions. While we do not doubt being labeled a sex
offender caused Renchenski stress and anxiety, dubbing him a
sex offender and mandating behavioral modification therapy
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does not constitute a deprivation of any basic human need.
Accordingly, the District Court properly entered summary
judgment in Defendants’ favor on Renchenski’s Eighth
Amendment claim.
2.

Procedural Challenge

Although we reverse the entry of summary judgment as
to Renchenski’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and affirm the
District Court’s Order in all other respects, we pause here to
briefly address Renchenski’s argument that the District Court
improperly converted Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment without permitting him leave to
take discovery.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that a
party opposing a motion for summary judgment may file an
affidavit asking the court to stay its decision while he or she
conducts discovery to ascertain facts essential to justifying his
or her opposition. Renchenski maintains that the District Court
should have stayed its disposition of the converted motion for
summary judgment and afforded him the opportunity to take
discovery on: (1) the consequences he may have been subject to
for refusal to participate in the SOTP; (2) Pennsylvania’s
application of the sex offender label to prisoners never
convicted of a sex offense; (3) the SOTP’s nature and details;
(4) Renchenski’s PSR and the coroner’s report; and (5)
Renchenski’s classification on the sex offender roster. While he
did not file a formal Rule 56(f) affidavit, in his opposition to
Defendant’s Supplemental Brief, Renchenski clearly addressed
the difficulty of disputing the DOC’s asserted facts because he
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had not yet been allowed discovery. (App. at 372 (“The plaintiff
has thus far been denied any type of discovery materials and it
is impossible for him to view, challenge, or verify that those
Standards and Practices [of the SOTP] are indeed written as the
defendants claim, and that the defendants are in fact following
them.”)).13
Although we review the District Court’s refusal to delay
its ruling on Defendants’ summary judgment motion under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard, we remain concerned
over the District Court’s disposition of this case. We have held
that while “it would be desirable in the interest of clarity for an
order to expressly notify the parties that the court was
converting a motion to dismiss into one of summary judgment
or that the ruling would be pursuant to Rule 56, the court need
not be so explicit so long as the order otherwise fairly apprises
the parties of the proposed conversion.” Rose v. Bartle, 871
F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations and & quotation marks
omitted).14 Here, the Order noted that the District Court
13

At the time the District Court ordered Defendants to
file a supplemental brief to satisfy its concern over potentially
legally significant material facts, and before the District Court
converted Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment, Renchenski’s discovery request was
pending.
14

We do not know whether the District Court sent
Renchenski a paper copy of its June 6, 2007 Order giving notice
of its intent to convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment.
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intended to rely on matters outside of the pleadings in its ruling,
and correctly stated that notice of the conversion and an
opportunity to respond are required. Nevertheless, we are
concerned that the notice may have been inadequate because the
Court never informed Renchenski of Rule 56’s requirements, his
need to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit to forestall Defendants’
motion for summary judgment, or of the consequences for his
failure to do so. Cf. Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in
converting a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion
when the court did not inform the pro se prisoner of the
consequences of failing to file a Rule 56(e) affidavit); Lewis v.
Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 101 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
In Kelly, the district court converted the defendants’
motion for dismissal into a motion for summary judgment
without informing the pro se prisoner that the court was treating
the defendants’ motion pursuant to Rule 56. Holding that the
district court prematurely disposed of the summary judgment
motion, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that:
A district court cannot properly act on a motion for
summary judgment without giving the opposing
party a reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits
that contradict the affidavits submitted in support
of the motion and demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue of material fact. . . . [R]easonable
opportunity presupposes notice. . . . [M]ere time is
not enough, if knowledge of the consequences of
not making use of it is wanting.
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963 F.2d at 456 (citation & quotation marks omitted). The D.C.
Circuit further concluded that in order for notice to be adequate,
it must explain the consequences of a Rule 56 motion and the
effect of a failure to file a Rule 56(e) affidavit in opposition,
which are particularly important in the pro se prisoner context.
Id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit noted, in dicta, that incarcerating
governmental defendants should assist district courts in
providing proper notice to prisoner pro se plaintiffs by including
in their motions for summary judgment a plain statement that
any factual assertions in the movant’s affidavits will be accepted
by the district court as true unless the plaintiff submits his or her
own affidavit or documentary evidence contradicting the
assertions. The D.C. Circuit also required that Rule 56’s text be
sent to the prisoner-plaintiff in addition to a short and plain
statement summarizing the appropriate portion of Rule 56.
When the government failed to provide such notice, the court
placed the burden on the district court to send proper notice to
the prisoner-plaintiff. Several other circuits have taken a similar
view and have required district courts and governmental
defendants to inform pro se prisoner-plaintiffs of the contours
of Rule 56 and of the specific consequences for failure to submit
an opposing affidavit. See generally Graham v. Lewinski, 848
F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988); Brown v. Shinbaum, 828 F.2d 707,
708 (11th Cir. 1987); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th
Cir. 1982); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.
1975); but see Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975 F.2d 192
(5th Cir. 1992); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding no additional procedure beyond that outlined
in Rule 56 is necessary in the non-prisoner pro se context);
Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-67 (9th Cir. 1986)
(same).
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We agree with the majority of our sister circuits that
adequate notice in the pro se prisoner context includes providing
a prisoner-plaintiff with a paper copy of the conversion Order,
as well as a copy of Rule 56 and a short summary explaining its
import that highlights the utility of a Rule 56(f) affidavit.15
While we are mindful that this extra requirement imposes some
burden upon the district courts as well as governmental
defendants, we believe this burden is slight especially since
generic language can be readily compiled and disseminated as
needed. We therefore trust that in the future, the State and
Federal Governments, as well as our district courts, will work
together to ensure pro se prisoner-plaintiffs receive adequate
notice of an imminent motion for summary judgment.
“The failure to give adequate notice does not, however,
require automatic reversal; it may be excused if the failure was
a harmless error. Thus, [a] judgment may be affirmed if it
appears that there is no set of facts on which plaintiffs could
possibly recover.” Rose, 871 F.2d at 342 (internal quotation
marks & citations omitted). As noted above, there are no set of
facts on which Renchenski could recover on his Fifth
Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment or equal
protection claims. Therefore, the District Court’s conversion of
Defendants’ motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment
and disposition of the case before Renchenski had proper notice
to respond was harmless.
15

In our view, the reasons for providing adequate notice
to incarcerated plaintiffs in the Rule 56(e) context apply with
equal force to Rule 56(f).
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor as to
Renchenski’s Due Process Clause claim. In all other respects,
we affirm the District Court’s Order.
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